Summary. Ð The globalization of world capitalism constrains the ability of the developmental state to pursue an independent industrialization and foreign trade strategy. We use an intertemporal, multiregion CGE model, to study the fundamental reasons for a ®nancial crisis. We ®nd that we can create a realistic crisis in the Asia region when capital markets are open and there is an unexpected rise in the risk premium of the Asia region. When capital markets are closed and the state retains all its policy instruments, the Asia region not only avoids a crisis but increases its rate of growth. Ó
INTRODUCTION
The Asian ®nancial crisis has had a profound impact on the global economy. Global growth have been slower; risks has been higher; and the international¯ows of capital have been severely disrupted. The crisis has also revealed the extent to which the globalization of world capitalism constrains the capacity of a developmental state to implement an independent strategy of industrialization and foreign trade.
Our reading of the actual Asian ®nancial crisis is that it cannot be explained by ®scal or monetary excesses. Nor can it be explained by a single factor. Rather, in practice, a multitude of factors, both domestic and international, contributed signi®cantly to the crisis. On the domestic side, there were faulty policies leading up to the crisis; an incorrect mix of government intervention with market forces in the governance and operation of both the ®nancial and corporate sectors; major instances of corruption; a lack of leadership commitment to development which allowed political considerations and, in some Asian countries, personal greed to dominate government economic decision.
The incorrect policies included maintaining an appreciating exchange rate, allowing wages to rise faster than productivity (especially in Korea), and maintaining a risk-adjusted real interest rate that was substantially higher than the world real rate. The combination of these policies led to a progressive loss of competitiveness on world markets and, ultimately, a negative balance of trade.
The inappropriate mix of government and market forces consisted of: combining government-mandated, corruption-motivated loans to mismanaged business groups with a lack of banking regulation and transparency; combining a high interest rate on loans with too low a spread between deposit rates and loan rates (especially in Korea); postponing the necessary World Development Vol. 28, No. 6, pp. 1087±1100, 2000 Ó 2000 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved Printed in Great Britain 0305-750X/00/$ -see front matter PII: S0305-750X(00)00014-0 www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev * A previous version of this paper was presented at a GTAP conference in Odensee Denmark, June 1999 and at the Third International Conference by METU in Ankara, September 1999. We are indebted to A. Salih, W. Mc Kibbin, N. Alemdar, K. Boratav, X. Diao and to colleagues at Berkeley and Bilkent for their helpful comments. None of them bears any responsibility for the policy implications and views expressed in this paper. adjustments of exchange rates to the appreciation of the domestic currencies induced by the Japanese recession; having an incorrect mix of regulation and liberalization of the ®nancial system, characterized by very little prudential regulation of banks and corporations combined with greater freedom in borrowing and lending, especially abroad; and removing controls on ®nancial markets combined with setting high domestic interest rates and maintaining domestic ®nancial repression.
On the international side, the actual crisis was due to institutional de®ciencies in the architecture of the global economy's ®nancial system to which the region had become vulnerable as a result of the liberalization of its ®nancial markets. Most contributors to this issue agree that the short-term global ®nancial markets are too large, too volatile, too perfect, and too subject to herd psychology.
Finally, one might also view the crisis as the result of a fundamental incompatibility between an independent national ®nancial policy with complete ®nancial liberalization. Two of the major policy mistakes of Asian countries were trying to have an exchange rate policy which was out of alignment with purchasing power parity and an interest rate which was out of alignment with world interest rates, while having largely liberalized capital ows. The Asian crisis demonstrated graphically that this is an economic impossibility. The crisis also revealed how unforgiving global markets are to mistakes in economic policy and to institutional inadequacies within countries and how severe the penalties for mistakes are.
Which of these multitude of factors were essential to the crisis? This is the question we attempt to answer in this paper. To disentangle the fundamental forces from the merely contributory ones requires a modeling approach. We utilize a multi-region, intertemporally consistent computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to study this issue. The global world economy is disaggregated into three regions (developed, underdeveloped, and the crisis-hit Asian economies), each of which produces output in four sectors (agriculture, consumer manufacturing, producer manufacturing, and services). The model is fully Walrasian. It has perfect markets with intertemporally rational, preference-optimizing consumers and pro®t-maximizing, competitive producers in both factor and commodity markets. The model also accommodates ®nan-cial¯ows, in the form of domestic and foreign bonds, that respond to interest rate dierentials.
The model is useful because it permits us to isolate analytically the conditions leading to a ®nancial crisis. The model can generate a ®nancial crisis without government intervention, irrational expectations, imperfect markets, lack of information, lack of transparency or corruption. We shall see that we are able to create a crisis, with roughly the same impact on growth as experienced by East Asia in actuality, in a full Arrow-Debreu setup with Ramsey-type forward-looking, intertemporally optimizing rational agents and no government intervention or International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality.
Experiments with the model indicate that the fundamental culprit is the liberalization of capital in¯ows and out¯ows. We can generate a crisis merely by adding foreign borrowing and lending to the traditional fully neoclassical real model. In contrast, by closing the domestic economy to international capital¯ows we can avoid a crisis. We model private foreign borrowing as a function of``®nancial arbitrage,'' i.e. of the dierential between the net, risk adjusted, real return on foreign exchange in domestic and world markets. Increased foreign indebtedness leads to increased ®nancial fragility of the region. The fragility is modeled by a risk-generator function which sets the regionÕs risk premium proportional to the ratio of its foreign de®cit to its aggregate GDP. The ®nancial crisis arises when there is a sudden, unexpected, but not irrational, increase in the proportionality parameter linking the de®cit-ratio to the region's risk premium in the riskgenerator function.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we provide a brief overview of theory and experience with ®nancial liberalization. We introduce the salient features of our computable generalized equilibrium (CGE) model in section 3. Section 4 presents a numerical general equilibrium analysis of the root-causes and consequences of the crisis. We draw the policy implications from a development-economics perspective in the ®nal section.
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION:
THEORY AND REALITY
The proponents of ®nancial liberalization rely on standard economic theory to deduce the proposition that, in a world of freely mobile capital, funds would¯ow from high-saving to low-saving countries, thereby equalizing interest rates globally and enabling countries to escape the size constraints upon their domestic asset markets. This hypothesis leads to the expectation that funds would¯ow from the capital-abundant``North'' to the capital-scarcè`S outh,'' promoting not only increased global eciency, but also improved global equity.
This benign view of the implications of international capital-mobility has been challenged signi®cantly by events in the last two decades. The ®ndings from many empirical case studies of recent ®nancial crises (especially, the Mexican, Turkish and East Asian ones) indicate that the expected bene®cial eects of capital in¯ows are overshadowed by the adverse impacts of excessive capital-market, stock-market and exchange-rate volatility. The eects of volatility had been generally ignored in traditional global capital market models.
Furthermore, in a world of volatile exchange rates, the theoretically-predicted global equalization of interest rates need not take place. In such a world the free mobility of international capital¯ows does not suce to equalize real domestic interest rates on loans that are denominated in dierent currencies. One can distinguish between two types of interest rate dierentials: covered and uncovered (see, e.g., Frankel, 1991) . Denoting the domestic and foreign interest rates by r and r Ã , respectively; and the forward premium on foreign currency by D, covered interest rate parity holds when r À r Ã D. By contrast, uncovered interest parity holds if the interest rate dierential is equated to the expected rate of depreciation of the currency: r À r Ã ED. This latter condition requires covered interest parity plus the absence of any exchange-risk premium. There is now ®rm evidence that while covered interest parity is satis®ed, for both developed economies and for those developing countries which have liberalized their capital markets, uncovered interest parity is not satis®ed. The persistent divergence between real rates of return across countries has been documented by Frankel (1991 Frankel ( , 1992 Frankel ( , 1993 , Marston (1997) , Halwood and MacDonald (1994) , Blecker (1998) and Eatwell (1996) . As noted by Frankel (1991, p. 252) a currency premium remains, consisting of an exchange risk premium plus expected real currency depreciation. This means that, even with the equalization of covered interest rates, large dierentials in real interest rates remain (emphasis original).
The currency premiums, with the resultant dierentials in real rates of return across countries, will provide one of the main dynamic adjustment mechanisms in our model. Finally, it is also worth noting that while the post®nancial liberalization global economy is characterized by very large gross capital¯ows, it has generated rather small net transfers. As indicated by Tobin (this issue), as of 1995, net capital¯ows from developed to underdeveloped countries were only $150 billions per annum, while the daily volume of, mostly speculative, foreign exchange transactions reached $1.5 trillions. The gross volume of international capital¯ows across national boundaries is far in excess of the ®nancing needs of the sum of commodity trade¯ows and investments in physical capital, and is mostly driven by speculative considerations of risk hedging and currency speculation. 
THE MODEL
The model is based on neoclassical growth theory. It is a global intertemporal computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with a multiregion speci®cation. We distinguish three regions (Underdeveloped POOR, Developed RICH, and Crisis-Hit Asian region, CHAR). Each region produces four types of goods in the same number of production-sectors.
The general characteristics of this model are well known: 2 In®nitely-lived households consume home produced and imported goods so as to maximize an additively separable, intertemporal utility function. Household income is either consumed or saved. Savings take the form of equity in domestic ®rms or in foreign bonds. The private agents in each region have free access to an open, unregulated, world capital market at a given world interest rate.
One distinguishing feature of the current model is its treatment of the determination of the interest rate at the regional level.
3 The domestic rate of interest diers from the world interest rate by a risk premium. The risk premium is determined endogenously, in a function which makes it proportional to the ratio of the foreign de®cit to GDP. The``Asian Crisis'' starts with a sudden rise in the proportionality parameter linking the risk premium to the ratio of the de®cit to GDP. Contagion to other developing countries occurs when the proportionality factor in the risk-premium function of the POOR region rises as well.
The main actors in the model are households and ®rms who interact in commodity and factor markets. Government does not consume, save or invest. Instead, we assume that all government income is transferred directly to households, in the form of lump-sum transfers. The government budget is therefore presumed to be always balanced and there are no macroeconomic, ®scal-®nance issues in this model.
(a) Households and their consumption/savings
In each region, the representative household owns labor, capital and all ®nancial wealth, and allocates income to consumption and savings so as to maximize an intertemporal utility over an in®nite horizon. The utility of the representative household in each region consists of the sum of the sequence of temporal utilities of aggregate consumption, discounted over an in®nite time horizon. It is maximized in:
where q is the positive rate of time preference; U Á is instantaneous felicity at each time period. TC t is the instantaneous aggregateconsumption generated by ®nal goods,
where 0`b i`1 , and Rb i 1. The household in each region maximizes (1) subject to an intertemporal budget constraint
where R t t s1 1a1 r s represents the discount-factor and r s is the instantaneous interest rate. In (3), P TC is the consumer price index such that P TC t TC t i PC it C it with PC it denoting the (composite) price of commodity-i; and x 1 is the present value of the private household's aggregate ®nancial wealth.
Households allocate their total income¯ows, from both ®nancial and non-®nancial sources, between consumption and savings. The current budget constraint for the household is:
where SAV is regional private savings; W is the wage rate; L the labor endowment; TI is the lump-sum transfer of the government's tax revenues; Wk the capital rental rate, K is the stock of physical capitalÐall in period t. The term r t D tÀ1 is the total interest payment on the outstanding foreign debt. The Euler equation (derived from the ®rst-order condition of intertemporal utility maximization) implies that marginal utility ratios across any two adjacent periods satisfy the following condition:
where U H t is the derivative of the instantaneous utility function at time t with respect to aggregate consumption TC t . Eqn. (5) states that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption at time t and t 1 must equal the ratio of the consumption price indices across the same time periods. Given the consumptionaggregation function (2), the price index of aggregate consumption, P TC , is determined from the individual good prices according to,
b) Firms and investment
The model distinguishes four production sectors: agriculture; consumer manufacturing; machinery and producer manufacturing; and services. Each sector produces a single output using labor, capital and intermediate goods as inputs. Labor and already-invested physical capital are not traded internationally. Valueadded in each sector is a Cobb±Douglas function of capital and labor. Intermediate inputuse is in ®xed proportions.
The aggregate capital stock is managed by an independent investor (bank) who decides on the total investment level in each period and passes on all pro®ts to households. The introduction of this bank-artifact serves to isolate the capital pricing and investment decisions of ®rms from the household-consumption and saving decisions. (As indicated below, foreign capital in¯ow makes up the dierence between aggregate domestic savings and investment.) The investor chooses a time path of investment which maximizes his discounted pro®t over an in®nite horizon:
subject to a set of capital-accumulation constraints:
where VI t is the value of investment at t; I t the new addition to physical capital; and d is the (constant) capital-depreciation rate. We assume that the technology for producing capitalequipment exhibits constant returns to scale, there is no technical progress, and that there are no additional capital-installation costs beyond the cost of the ®nal goods used in capital-goods production. Hence, when the level of investment is positive, in equilibrium, the value of each unit of capital equipment is uniquely determined by the prices of the investment goods. Thus, VI t P I t I t , where P I t is the cost for each unit of I t .
Under conditions of open, unregulated world capital markets, in equilibrium, the following no-arbitrage condition must also be satis®ed:
This condition states that the total returns to capital must match the return to a perfectly substitutable asset of size P I tÀ1 . The left-hand side of Eqn. (9) represents the returns from a perfectly substitutable asset of size P I tÀ1 , and the right side of (9) is the total return from one unit of capital equipment, consisting of``dividends'' from capital-ownership at each period, Wk t , minus the loss of value of capital equipment caused by depreciation, dP I t , plus a claim to an instantaneous capital gain (or loss) equal to P I t À P I tÀ1 , if the cost of producing one unit of capital changes over time. The no-arbitrage condition of Eqn. (9) is used to determine the path of investment-demand in each region.
(c) The foreign sector and foreign assets Commodities are dierentiated in both demand and supply by their geographical origin. Regions are linked, on the demand side, by an Armingtonian composite-good system, and, on the supply side, by a constant-elasticity-oftransformation (CET) system. Domestically produced and foreign goods are regarded as imperfect substitutes in both trade and production, and assigned elasticities of substitution and transformation.
In each period, as investment and savings are independently determined in the model, the dierence between the value of investment, P I t I t , and the regional private savings, SAV t , if positive, is the increase in debt of the home region borrowed from the other two foreign regions; i.e.,
where r t D tÀ1 is the debt service payment and a positive FB t represents the foreign trade de®cit.
(d) Determination of the risk premium
In view of the persistence of signi®cant interest rate dierentials across countries (see section 2), we use the following version of uncovered interest parity spelled out in real terms:
where r is the domestic (region RÕs) interest rate; r Ã is the world interest rate in the international capital market; DP R denotes changes in domestic (region RÕs) price level; DP Ã denotes changes in world price level; D R is the change in nominal exchange rate; and p R is the risk premium which attaches to the domestic (region RÕs) capital market.
Transforming, we obtain:
which decomposes interest-dierentials into two components: deviations from relative purchasing power parity (the right-hand side term in parenthesis) and a real risk premium. Since we de®ne the real exchange rate as the ratio of domestic to the foreign price level (see below) the terms in parenthesis vanish and we are left with: r 2 r Ã p R . We model the risk premium as a function of the ratio of the foreign de®cit to GDP:
Eqn. (11) is designed to capture the underlying disequilibrating characteristics of free international capital mobility: with a``positive'' signal from the domestic economy, capital in¯ows are attracted into the domestic asset markets, causing a rapid accumulation of current-account de®cits. The initial bonanza of debt-®-nanced public (e.g., Turkey) or private (e.g., Mexico, Korea) spending escalates rapidly. This raises the risk-premium and generates severe fragility in the shallow ®nancial markets of the home country. Eventually, the bubble bursts, and a series of severe and onerous adjustments are set in motion: very high real interest rates, sizable devaluations, and a severe retrenchment of aggregate demand. When the short-term``hot money'' rushes out, the country is left broke, in a state of austerity and deprived of traditional tools of macroeconomic adjustment. This process generates an endogenous ®nancial crisis analogous to that delineated by Minsky (1954) for the interaction of domestic business cycles with ®nancial cycles. Elements of this vicious cycle are described in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) , Diao, Li and Yeldan (1998) , Dornbusch, Goldfajn and Vald es (1995), Velasco (1987) , Diaz-Alejandro (1985) , and more recently referred to as the Neftc ßi±Frenkel cycle in Taylor (1998 ) (following Neftc ßi, 1998 Frenkel, 1998) .
(e) Equilibrium
Intratemporal equilibrium requires that during each time period, (i) in each region, demand for production factors equals their supply; (ii) in world commodity markets, aggregate demand for each sectoral good equals its total supply; (iii) and in the world's capital market, aggregate household savings equals zero when summed over all regions.
Intertemporal equilibria are described mainly by the dierence Eqs. (5), (9) (f) The numeraire
Central to any general equilibrium model is the speci®cation of the numeraire, which we now make precise. In each region K, de®ne the cost of living index at period t by,
where X Ki is the weight of price i (which is set equal to the share in consumption-demand of the ith good). We choose the period 1 price index of the RICH region as the unit of value in our analysis. Therefore, all nominal values are expressed relative to PINDEX RICH Y1 . Of particular interest is the concept of the real exchange rate, which we de®ne as the relative cost of the common reference basket of goods among two regions, where the basketsÕ costs in the two regions are compared after conversion into the common numeraire. For two regions A and B, with price levels PINDEX AYt and PINDEX BYt , we say that region-A experiences a real appreciation (region-B, real depreciation) when the ratio of the respective price indexes, PINDEX AYt /PINDEX BYt , rises (see, e.g., Obstfeld & Rogo, 1996 , chapter 4).
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF THE ASIAN CRISIS
What are the minimal conditions for generating a ®nancial crisis? To answer this question we impose the same economic shock on the Asia region under two distinct scenarios, re¯ecting extremes in the degrees of external liberalization of the economy. Under the ®rst scenario, neither trade nor capital markets are liberalized and the state retains its full panoply of policy instruments (experiment 1). Under the second scenario, both commodity markets and ®nancial markets are completely liberalized; as a result, the state has becomes economically ineective, as it has no policy instruments at its disposal (experiments 2 and 3). In this scenario we analyze the consequences for all regions with and without contagion from the Asia region to the region of least developed nations.
(a) Experiment 1: the developmental state:
closed capital markets, pre-GATT
Under the ®rst scenario, we examine quantitatively the dynamics of the so-called Neftc ßi-Frenkel cycle (Taylor, 1998) in the context of Asian development. Starting from a reference path, we assume that the East Asian region experiences a parametric rise of 5% in the productivity of investment in physical capital. 4 The positive productivity shock induces a rise in aggregate demand for investment in the region. Since in this experiment external ®nance is restricted, however, the burden of adjustment falls entirely on the domestic economy. In view of the regionÕs history of active export promotion, we assume that the government responds to the need for increased foreign exchange and savings by introducing an export-subsidization program. We then let the model solve for the necessary adjustments in sectoral subsidy rates required to generate the requisite¯ow of foreign exchange earnings essential for ®nanc-ing the larger level of investment needed to take advantage of its greater productivity.
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The dynamics of adjustment are summarized in the EXP-1 columns of Table 1 . The positive shock in the productivity of aggregate investment leads to a rise of investment expenditures by 18.4%, prompting both increased domestic savings and more foreign exchange earnings through enhanced exports. Speci®cally, our numerical results indicate that the domestic saving rate is increased by three percentage points, from 29% to 32%, as the marginal rate of substitution between current and future consumption falls due to the higher productivity of savings. The impact equilibrium rate of export subsidy rises by ®ve percentage points. The region meets the increased import demand (by 7.3% upon impact) through increased export earnings, and the overall foreign balance is maintained constant, at its initial base-path level.
The real exchange rate appreciates, due to the nature of the shock. Positive gains in GDP lead to a rise in the cost of the domestic consumption basket relative to its world-market price. Yet, the government does not allow the appreciation of the real exchange rate to deteriorate the competitiveness of exports; it counteracts this eect by its active subsidization of exports. 6 The gross domestic product increases by 6.8% over its base path, and, as households respond to the higher returns on savings by substituting future consumption for current consumption. Domestic savings rise to ®nance the increased pace of capital accumulation. This enables the aggregate capital stock to be 7.5% larger by period 15. Thus, the positive productivity shock and active government response, permitted by the absence of restraints on commercial policy and closed ®nancial markets, result in a substantial net bene®t to the economy. Now consider the same productivity shock under a post-GATT regime, which abolishes export subsidies, and with a deregulated capital account. With unregulated, open capital markets, the productivity gains stimulate foreign capital in¯ows. In addition, rational domestic agents substitute consumption intertemporally, reducing today's consumption in favor of greater future consumption. Current consumption expenditures fall, allowing domestic savings to rise to help ®nance increased investment expenditures. Up to here the eects on the economy are bene®cial. There is an investment boom, and an increase in the rate of economic growth typical of the ®rst phase of ®nancial crises in an open economy.
The increased foreign capital in¯ow, however, inevitably leads to an appreciation of the domestic currency in real terms, resulting in a loss of international competitiveness of the country's exports. This leads to a contraction of exports relative to what they would have been without the appreciation. The foreign de®cit widens as a result. This rise in de®cit is interpreted by international ®nancial markets as a signal of increased ®nancial fragility, typical of the second phase of a ®nancial crisis, in which a boom carries with it the seeds of its own destruction due to greater ®nancial risk.
Our numerical simulations indicate that, by comparison with the initial reference path, the foreign de®cit widens threefold upon impact to reach 6.3% of GDP. The percentage de®cit remains above 4% until the end of the ®rst ®ve years of adjustment, and does not converge back to its initial level until year 10 (see Figure  1) . The international ®nancial markets respond Figure 1 . Ratio of foreign de®cit to the GDP under unregulated capital in¯ows. WORLD DEVELOPMENTto this indicator of the boom's ®nancial fragility by withdrawing capital from the economy abruptly, in a herd-psychology induced selfful®lling panic. Net foreign capital in¯ows drop to 63% of their base value.
We model the ®nancial fragility of the East Asian region with the aid of the risk generator function (Eqn. (11) above) in which the risk premium rises (falls) in proportion to the ratio of foreign de®cit to GDP. We simulate the panic elements of the crisis by an abrupt, parametric, 10-fold rise in the risk parameter PR in Eqn. (11). This has the eect of increasing the domestic rate of interest over the world interest rate substantially and of choking o foreign lending. Consequently, investment demand drops abruptly, and GDP contracts despite a real devaluation.
Observe that, in this formulation of ®nancial fragility, the``deterioration'' of macro fundamentals which leads to an increase in risk premium, re¯ects neither public mismanagement, nor de®ciencies in banking or corporate governance, nor market imperfections or moral hazard, but is a direct consequence of the inherent characteristics of well-functioning, integrated global capital markets. Indeed, as many contributors to this special issue claim, one might say that the ®nancial markets are too perfect. They permit herd behavior leading to ®nancial panic and crisis.
We summarize the response of the region's main macroeconomic aggregates to the crisis and the contagion eects in the world ®nancial and commodity markets under the EXP-2 columns of Table 1 . We present our numerical results for this experiment as percentages of their values in EXP-1, the environment with regulated capital¯ows. Our results indicate that, by comparison to EXP-1, gross domestic product in the Asian region contracts by 8.2% upon impact, and remains trapped in a 3.1% lower long-run equilibrium growth path. In Figure 2 , we depict the extent of cumulative losses of GDP in relation to their theoretically expected, potential level. Such losses in potential GDP escalate rapidly and reach 25% by period 5, and 70% by period 15.
The major macro aggregates of the postcrisis adjustment path of the East Asia region are further portrayed in Figure 3 . The sudden increase in the risk premium leads to a divergence between the domestic (regional) interest rate and the world interest rate. The resulting increase in the regional rate of interest chokes o investment demand (by 7.2% upon impact, and by 4.6% as of period 15), and reduces private consumption expenditures, but only very slightly. The contraction of investment leads directly to a slowdown in capital accumulation and decline in real output. The deceleration in the rate of growth of the capital stock deepens progressively, and by period 15, is 3.0% lower than in EXP-1 (Figure 3) . Thus, the experiment indicates that the postcrisis adjustment of the Asian region involves substantial contraction of real output together with sluggish accumulation patterns.
Had it not been for the increase in the economy's risk premium (which is, alas, inevitable) and for the unregulated nature of capital ows, the contraction in investment and output Figure 2 . Cumulative loss of post-crisis GDP compared to intertemporal equilibrium of EXP-1.
MINIMAL CONDITIONS FOR A FINANCIAL CRISIS
would have resulted in a self-regulating economic cycle and a soft landing even without government policy intervention. With normal marginal eciency of investment curves, the expansion of the capital stock which preceded the crisis would have eventually led to a drop in the marginal productivity of investment, triggering a decline in the rate of growth of further investment expenditures, and a narrowing in the savings-investment gap. In¯ows of foreign capital would then have been reduced, the foreign de®cit fallen and the exchange rate devalued. The economy would have been running a trade surplus to pay for the interest costs of the initial debt accumulated. And intertemporal optimizers, who initially raised their savings in response to the increase in the rate of return of invested saving, would now reduce their savings and enjoy a higher level of consumption into the inde®nite future. In the very long run, the economy would have approached a new, lower, steady-state equilibrium. Instead, however, rather than the smooth adjustments forecast by textbook models of consumption smoothing and intertemporal optimization, the openness of capital markets and increase in regional risk premium allowed the disequilibria in fundamentals to escalate. Massive movements of capital ampli®ed the traditional adjustment process so much that the economy overshot and was unable to return to its pre-shock, long-run equilibrium growth path. In the case of our experiment, the massive movements of capital wound up inducing an escalation in risk-premium which converted a positive shock into a ®nancial and real crisis. The real negative shock generated by the large capital out¯ows far exceeded that required for adjustment and persisted into the long run. In the words of Blecker (1998, p. 30 In this experiment, we study the eects of contagion to other developing countries. Technically, we model the contagion cycle by repeating Experiment 2, but with increased risk premium for the POOR region as well. Thus, we impose increased fragility in global capital markets.
We ®nd that the contagion cycle is more contractionary for the rest of the developing world than was the ®nancial crisis for the East Asian region. This is partly due to the fact that the POOR region's ®nancial crisis did not result from an initial increase in the productivity of its capital, but was simply the result of irrational contagion from East Asia. Even though the pre-crisis, precontagion fundamentals of the region remained unchanged, foreign capital in¯ows into the region collapse. The POOR region's GDP declines by as much 7.8% (EXP-3 path of Table 1 ) upon impact and remains 6.8% below its base level in year 15. Fixed investment demand slumps by 7.9% at impact (Figure 4) . 
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The long-term eects of the crisis are felt more severely over time as the deceleration of the rate of capital accumulation deepens; it reaches a 20% lower level by year 15. The impact on the POOR, contagion-hit region, which was completely blameless, is thus permanent.
A counterpart of all these adjustments is the behavior of the (real) exchange rate. Our numerical results show a real depreciation of the currency in both postcrisis Asia and postcontagion underdeveloped region. But the magnitude of the real depreciation in the model was much smaller than it had been in the actual Asian crisis. When the capital¯ows are drastically reduced (see Figure 5 ) domestic currencies suer a real depreciation of only 7.1% as compared to the 50% depreciation that occurred in practice in the Asian region. One can conjecture that the lower depreciation in the model is due to the fact that the model economy does not undergo a banking crisis at the same time as it experiences a ®nancial crisis. While domestic interest rate escalate, there is no scramble for liquidity in the model, and no liquidation of assets to obtain foreing exchange. In addition, the model has¯exible exchange rates, so that the adjustment to the shock imparted by the reversal of capital¯ows can be more gradual. In our formulation, exchange rate declines do not, in and of them- selves, aect the risk premium and cause increased capital out¯ows and greater domestic interest rates.
Perhaps the most pernicious long-run eect of the Asian crisis on their development consist of the nature of the structural change that it induces in real output supplies, capital accumulation and pattern of economic growth. Upon impact, we observe a drop in the gross output of consumer and producer manufacturing industries and a rise in agriculture and services. In the short run, this eect is due purely to relative price movements. In the medium term, the decline in manufacturing results from the contraction of aggregate investment demand, which leads to a de¯a-tionary environment in which demand for producer-manufacturing falls in a sustained fashion. (Figure 6 ). As patterns of capital accumulation diverge from their base trajectory, producer-manufacturing output-growth slows down and a process of deindustrialization develops. This is arguably the most detrimental long-run consequence of ®nancial crises for economic development.
POLICY DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Experiments 1 and 2 describe how a ®nancial crisis arises when capital markets are open and does not arise when capital markets are closed and the government retains its full arsenal of instruments for policy intervention. By generating the ®nancial crisis within a set of globally interacting world regions embedded in a CGE model, we stripped away a large number of features of reality that are often blamed for giving rise to ®nancial crises. The model in which the opening up of capital markets breeds a ®nancial crisis is entirely neoclassical, with fully functioning commodity and ®nancial markets, in which both factor movements and trade adjust¯exibly to market conditions. The actors are completely rational and forward looking. Exchange rates are¯exible. Financial markets are not plagued by moral hazard or incomplete information. The banking system is not underdeveloped or underregulated. In the model banks intermediate perfectly between savings and investment, allocating resources to their most pro®table uses. Financial transactions occur at arm's-length, and are not characterized by crony capitalism. Corruption does not play a role in the interaction of the private sector of the model economy with either the government or the ®nancial system. There are no macroeconomic excesses, as the government budget is always balanced. There is also no IMF.
The crisis is generated endogenously by a single trigger: an increase in the risk premium that is fully justi®ed by the mounting level of foreign indebtedness and by the increasing size of the current account de®cit in the periods preceding the crisis. In turn, the rising de®cit and foreign indebtedness are themselves due to large in¯ows of foreign capital fueled by expectations of high economic growth triggered, in our model, by increases in domestic productivity. When expectations turn, the risk premium soars, precipitating large decreases in short-term capital in¯ows and giving rise to a full-blown ®nancial-cum-real crisis. WORLD DEVELOPMENTFrom a policy point of view, the very starkness of the picture of the ®nancial crisis painted by our simulations implies that many of the remedies suggested for avoiding future ®nancial crises will do no such thing. These include: ®nancial sector reform; better information; the creation of a new international institution to supervise international ®nancial transactions and operate as a lender of last resort; cleaning up corruption in lending; getting the government out of the targeting business; and improving the governance of the corporate sector. Of course, these reforms may well reduce the magnitude of ®nancial crises once they arise and may well contribute to the institutional maturity of the country. Indeed, while, in our model economy, the growth rate declines resulting from the crisis are of roughly the right order of magnitude, the collapse in asset values and exchange rates devised by the model is considerably too modest. In addition, the suggested institutional reforms may well be desirable in and of themselves, as they are likely to contribute to the institutional maturation of the developing country.
It is nevertheless signi®cant that, in aǹ`e conomy'' in which all of the reforms listed above (other than a new international ®nancial institution), are already in place, the declines in growth rates are of roughly the right orders of magnitude. The only thing our model required for a crisis to develop was short-term ®nancial markets open to international ®nancial¯ows and the herd-behavior induced by common perceptions of future prospects that are typical of all expectation-based markets. In this vein, our analytical model suggests that the fundamental remedy for ®nancial crises lies in regulating short-term international¯ows. Our experiments thus highlight the now classic dictum due to Keynes, Aabove all, let ®nance be primarily``national.'' Avoidance of a ®nancial crisis is not the only reason for preferring a global economy with more regulated short-term ®nancial¯ows to one in which international capital markets are completely open. The main reason may well be that unregulated short-term capital markets rob national economies of all the indirect, untargeted policy instruments they retain in a post-GATT world. These instruments are needed not only for macroeconomic purposes but also for the promotion of industrialization and development.
When fully open capital markets replace the combination of closed short-term capital markets and regulated¯ows of foreign investment, governments become unable to employ their traditional policy instruments (interest rates, government expenditures and exchange rates) unilaterally, for fear of triggering a ®nancial crisis: Raising interest rates above world markets induces a large foreign capital in¯ow, setting the stage for a subsequent ®nancial crisis; ®xing them below world markets, precipitates a large foreign capital out¯ow, generating the crisis immediately. Similarly, setting exchange rates above equilibrium levels leads to a current account de®cit, raising risk premiums and domestic interest rates, and leading to a subsequent crisis; ®xing exchange rates below equilibrium stimulates capital¯ight and investment abroad in anticipation of further devaluations, producing the crisis outright. Finally, running a budget de®cit to stimulate growth or provide social programs more generous than the international norm, causes capital out¯ows. Flexible exchange rates, have two opposite eects: on the one hand, they enable less abrupt adjustments and therefore may well lead to a softer landing. On the other hand,¯exible exchange rates may well amplify the eects of international capital¯ows by allowing speculation on foreign exchange markets that are excessively large; excessively liquid; excessively volatile; too imperfectly informed; and too subject to herd psychology.
In the words of the UNCTADÕs (1998) Trade and Development Report, the ascendancy of ®nance over industry together with the globalization of ®nance have become underlying sources of instability and unpredictability in the world economy. (...) In particular, ®nancial deregulation and capital account liberalization appear to be the best predictor of crises in developing countries (pp. v and 55) .
Almost all recent episodes of ®nancial-cumcurrency instability indicate that the observed sharp swings in capital¯ows are mostly a re¯ection of large divergences between domestic ®nancial conditions and those in the rest of the world. These divergences may well have been required to implement national objectives. Reversals of capital¯ows are often associated with deterioration of the macroeconomic fundamentals in the domestic country. However,``such deterioration often results from the eects of capital in¯ows themselves as well as from external developments, rather than from shifts in domestic macroeconomic policies'' (UNCTAD, 1998, p. 56) .
